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Abstract 
Despite the increasing importance of EU sanctions, little is known about their 
effects on conflict intensity in the case of armed conflicts. In addition, even though 
different types of EU sanctions cause different effects, they are often not examined 
separately. This thesis examines how different types of EU sanctions affect the 
intensity of armed conflicts. To research both the statistical correlations and the causal 
relationships underlying them, this thesis uses a mixed-method design. The 
quantitative part examines all EU sanctions on armed conflicts between 1992 and 
2012 and the qualitative part revolves around the EU sanctions imposed with regards 
to the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast in 2010-2011. The results indicate that EU 
sanctions are likely to decrease the intensity of a conflict if they are imposed as multi-
type sanction regime, including a travel ban.  Moreover, the case study indicates that 
EU sanctions should be well aligned with the actions of other international actors in 
order to have the greatest impact.  This thesis concludes that it is a good idea to 
impose EU sanctions in order to decrease the human suffering if they adhere to the 
following two criteria: (1) the sanctions are imposed as a multi-type sanction regime 
including a travel ban, (2) the sanctions are well aligned with the measures of other 
international actors. 
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Introduction  
Since the end of August 2017, the world is frightened by the intensification of 
violence of the Burmese military targeting the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, and 
the high intensity of this conflict. In response to the aggravation of this crisis, multiple 
international actors have imposed or prolonged sanctions. One of the most important 
actors in this regard is the European Union (EU). In this situation, the EU has acted by 
extending its targeted sanctions against Myanmar various times. Most recently, the 
EU extended the sanctions on 26 April 2018 (European Council, 2018). This decision 
is not an isolated case. Very often, sanctions are the chosen measures by the EU to 
deal with international crises and armed conflicts (Eriksson, 2011, p.1; Hultman & 
Peksen, 2017 p. 1316, Portela, 2010, xiii).  
The EU sanctions against Myanmar are thus not the first and only instance the 
EU has taken restrictive measures. Ever since the 1990s, the EU is becoming a more 
important sanctions-actor and has imposed them more frequently (Eriksson, 2011, p. 
4; Giumelli & Ivan, 2013, p. 1; Portela, 2010, introduction; Vines, 2012, p. 874). This 
is partly due to the fact that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is 
experiencing a lack of productivity when it comes to facing today’s global challenges 
(Vines, 2012, p. 867). For example, Russia and China have blocked sanctions 
multiple times (Vines, 2012, p. 867). As this lack of productivity is likely to endure, 
regional actors such as EU are (and will be) dealing with issues that should be 
handled by the UNSC (Vines, 2012, p. 867). Furthermore, the EU is often the first to 
act in the case of human rights violations (Kreutz, 2015). Moreover, the EU is unique 
because of its hybrid character and therefore even more interesting as a point of focus 
in the sanctions literature (Giumelli, 2013, p. 11). However, despite its increased 
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relevance and activity, EU sanctions in its totality have not been addressed enough in 
the sanctions literature (Giumelli, 2013, p. 10).  
Within the current literature on sanctions in general, a lot of attention is 
devoted to questions regarding the compliance of sanctions to policy objectives and to 
the end-result of sanctions. However, the question whether sanctions decrease the 
intensity of armed conflicts is overlooked in much of this current literature (Hultman 
& Peksen, 2017, p.1317). Consequently, there is a need for research that focuses on 
this question (Eriksson & Wallensteen, 2015, p. 1390; Giumelli, 2013, p.10; Hultman 
& Peksen, 2017, p. 1318). In the narrow field of research small that does focus on the 
effect sanctions have on conflict intensity (Eriksson & Wallensteen, 2015), no 
distinction is made between different types of sanctions. This is remarkable, since 
different types of sanctions are expected to have different effects (Giumelli, 2013, p. 
42). Three gaps can thus be observed in the current literature. These gaps revolve 
around the lack of attention paid to (1) EU sanctions, (2) the effect of sanctions on 
conflict intensity and (3) the differences in effect of various sanction types. On the 
basis of this previous discussion, the guiding question of this thesis is: How do 
different types of EU sanctions affect conflict intensity? 
Taking all of the above into account, the contribution of this thesis is three-
fold. Firstly, by solely focusing on the EU it sheds light on an increasingly important 
actor on the sanctions scene that is currently under-addressed in the literature 
(Giumelli, 2013, p. 10). Secondly, it contributes to the current under-researched field 
on the effect that sanctions have on conflict intensity. Thirdly, it distinguishes 
between different types of sanctions and their effects. This last point is particularly 
interesting when making policy recommendations on the use of sanctions as a tool for 
the EU. In addition, these recommendations based on EU sanctions can also be 
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valuable for policy makers concerned with the sanctioning practice of the UN 
(Eriksson, 2005, p. 119). 
When referring to EU sanctions, this thesis only considers targeted sanctions. 
It does so because from the 1990s we witnessed a clear shift from the so-called 
‘comprehensive’ sanctions towards the ‘targeted’ sanctions (Eriksson, 2011, p.1; 
Portela, 2016, p. 912; Wallensteen, 2011, p. 176). It is this period where the EU 
started to engage with the practice of imposing sanctions (De Vries & Hazelzet, 2005, 
p. 95).  
The theoretical assumptions of this thesis expect every type of EU sanction to 
decrease the intensity of the conflict. Arms embargoes and multi-type sanction 
regimes are expected to have the largest decreasing effect on conflict intensity. These 
assumptions are examined via a mixed-method design. The quantitative research of 
this thesis indicates that the type of the imposed EU sanction is crucial for its effect on 
conflict intensity. More concretely, it indicates that EU sanctions only decrease 
conflict intensity whenever they are imposed as a multi-type sanction regime, 
including a travel ban. Based on its qualitative research, this thesis argues that a mix 
of multiple economic sanctions and a travel ban decrease conflict intensity by 
constraining the target(s) in various ways. Furthermore, in order to decrease the 
intensity of an armed conflict, EU sanctions must be well aligned with the actions of 
other international actors.  
This thesis proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the current 
sanctions literature and thereby explores what is now known about (EU) sanctions and 
their effects. The subsequent section presents the theoretical assumptions regarding 
the effects of various types of EU sanctions on conflict intensity. Following this, a 
section expands on the mixed-method design of this thesis. This section answers the 
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questions of why this design is chosen and how it is put in practice. This section is 
followed by the empirical analysis, consisting of a quantitative and qualitative part. 
This thesis concludes with a summary of the results and a discussion of its limitations. 
Lastly, implications for further research and policy making are discussed.  
 
What do we know about sanctions so far? 
This section gives an overview on what is known about restrictive measures so 
far. The first part of this section focuses on various characteristics of sanctions. Since 
the focus of this thesis is on EU sanctions, the main goal of this part is to outline the 
characteristics of these measures in particularly. However, the majority of the 
concepts mentioned can also be applied to sanctions in general. The second part of 
this section revolves around the scholarly debate on the effect of sanctions and the 
shortcomings of this existing literature. 
 
Characteristics of sanctions 
(EU) sanctions are a complex phenomenon that is not easy to understand 
(Eriksson, 2011, p. 234). Every sanction has a different context, logic and form 
(Giumelli, 2013, p. 39, p. 45). In addition, every (EU) sanction regime has to be seen 
as part of a wider package of measures that includes other policy instruments and 
other sanction regimes (Biersteker & Portela, 2015, p. 1; Eriksson, 2011, p. 237). 
Building on previous work on UN sanctions, five different contexts can be identified 
in which EU sanctions are imposed: conflict management, democracy promotion, 
post-conflict consolidation, non-proliferation of weapons and countering terrorism 
(Charron, 2011, pp. 7 – 11; Giumelli, 2013, p. 42). Since the focus of this thesis is the 
effect of sanctions on conflict intensity, two contexts are especially relevant because 
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they are both connected to armed conflict: conflict management and democracy 
promotion (Giumelli, 2013, p. 42). Sanctions in the context of conflict management 
entail that the “EU intervenes in civil conflicts or crises where an outbreak of 
aggression between third parties has already taken place” (Giumelli, 2013, p. 42). 
Whenever sanctions are imposed in reaction to human right violations and/or a 
worsening of the democratic standards they fall under the context democracy 
promotion (Giumelli, 2013, p. 42). Since the beginning of the 21st century, the 
frequency in which EU sanctions are imposed against targets within the context of 
armed conflict is increased (Portela, 2010, p. 59). 
In addition to having different contexts, (EU) sanctions neither follow the 
same logic. The sanction’s logic is the expected way a sanction exercises power 
(Giumelli, 2013, p. 39).  Three categories can be identified: coercing, constraining 
and signalling (Bazoobandi, 2015, p. 7). A coercive sanction is implemented to force 
the target to change its behaviour according to the sender’s wishes (Bazoobandi, 
2015, p.7). However, whenever a sanction is implemented in an armed conflict, their 
logic tends to be constraining and/or signalling (Giumelli, 2013, p. 39). Sanctions that 
follow these logics are expected to reduce the available policy options for the targets 
and make their life harder (Giumelli, 2013, p. 9). In the situation of an armed conflict, 
they force the warring parties to exercise constraint and thereby they reduce violence. 
Furthermore, they try to target the entities that destruct peace processes in order to 
make negotiations more likely and conflict intensity less (Eriksson & Wallensteen, 
2015, p. 1394). Because of the targeted nature of today’s sanction regimes, some 
entities can be constrained within a conflict while others are signalled, all within the 
same (EU) sanctions regime (Giumelli, 2013, p. 39).  The three logics are thus not 
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mutually exclusive and multiple logics can be at work within the same type of 
sanction (Giumelli, 2013, p. 39).   
Regarding the form of (EU) sanctions, 4 types have been categorized in the 
sanction literature: assets freezes, arms embargoes, commodity and service boycotts 
and travel bans (Cortright & lopez, 2002).  
 
Effects of sanctions 
The scholarly debate on sanctions can generally be divided into three streams 
that all have different points of focus: success rate, end-results and conflict intensity. 
The first stream focuses on the success rate of sanctions, i.e.: whether they achieve the 
policy objective (Portela, 2016, p. 913). Eriksson (2011) makes a distinction between 
primary and secondary policy objectives. The primary objectives are to “encourage 
democracy, stop human rights violations and suppression of internal opposition, 
enforce peace agreements, assist in the pursuit of individuals for prosecution before 
international courts and ensure compliance with treaty obligations” (Eriksson, 2011, 
p.2). Secondary objectives are concerned with the sender’s reputation. The success-
rate of sanctions is closely linked to their effective implementation (Eriksson, 2011, p. 
104).  
Scholars within the second stream focus on the end-results sanctions have. 
They do not solely focus on the achievement of policy objectives because, according 
to them, sanctions fulfil several functions and the adherence to stated policy 
objectives is only one of this (Portela, 2010, p. 10). This stream can generally be 
divided into two schools of thought who disagree heavily. On the one hand, various 
scholars argue in favour of sanctions. In this respect, imposed sanctions are effective 
in shortening the duration of civil wars (Drezner, 2011; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Krain, 
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2014) and increase the likelihood of conflict resolution (De Rouen & Sobek, 2004). In 
contrast to these views, other scholars argue that sanctions make a negotiated 
settlement less likely (Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999) and that sanctions do not 
decrease the expected duration of civil war (Regan & Aydin, 2006).  
In addition to the points of focus of these two streams (success rate and end-
results), a third stream is beginning to emerge. In 2015, Eriksson and Wallensteen 
(2015) began to strive for a new research agenda that focuses on the effect of 
sanctions on conflict intensity in particular. Although the two previous mentioned 
streams are connected to this, they do not clearly specify what effects sanctions have 
on conflict intensity. Consequently, they neither indicate why, how and which type of 
sanction decrease the intensity of a conflict. As illustrated before, this question has 
received substantially less attention (Hultman & Peksen, 2017, p. 1318). Eriksson and 
Wallensteen (2015) argue that UN sanctions decrease the intensity of an armed 
conflict. However, three shortcomings of this article make that this research agenda is 
not fully developed. Firstly, the statement of Eriksson and Wallensteen is based on 
preliminary findings and further research is hence needed (2015, p. 1398). Secondly, 
this research is solely focused on UN sanctions while EU sanctions, as mentioned, are 
becoming increasingly important (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013). The third shortcoming of 
this article is that they do not differentiate between different types of sanctions, nor 
take into account the difference between single-type sanction regimes and multi-type 
sanction regimes. Accordingly, they do not specify which type of sanctions has the 
largest effect on conflict intensity although this is expected to make a difference 
(Giumelli, 2013, p. 42).  The subsequent section of this thesis will address these 
shortcomings and thereby contribute to maturation of this third stream and the 
literature on sanctions in general. 
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Building hypotheses: how do EU sanctions effect conflict intensity? 
To understand how EU sanctions decrease the intensity of a conflict and to 
learn which type of sanctions has the largest effect, this thesis builds upon existing 
research on conflict intensity (Eck 2009, Heger & Salehyan 2007, Lujala 2009). Since 
all different types of EU sanctions affect the intensity of a conflict in a different 
manner (Giumelli. 2013 p. 43), each sanction-type is examined separately in this 
section.  
 
Travel bans 
Travel bans limit the target’s freedom to carry out certain actions, cause 
personal inconvenience (Brzoska, 2003, p. 522) and can affect the legitimacy of the 
target (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2000; Eriksson, 2005, p. 118). Furthermore, they are an 
effective tool to isolate the target and hinder it from ‘doing business as usual’ 
(Eriksson, 2005, p. 32; p. 111). Because of these consequences of travel bans, the 
target is more likely to co-operate with the sender (Guimelli, 2013, p.44). Moreover, 
the target is not able to continue carrying out the same (violent) behaviour (Eriksson, 
2005, p. 32). An imposed travel ban is thus expected to reduce the total number of 
battle-related deaths. Important to note is that travel bans are rarely used solely but 
rather as part of a sanction regime that also includes other types of sanctions 
(Cosgrove, 2005, p. 207). In a situation where a travel ban is imposed in combination 
with other measures, it is most effective (Eriksson, 2011, p.31). 
 
Arms embargoes 
An imposed arms embargo will decrease the relative fighting capabilities 
because of the reduction in the inflow of arms (Giumelli, 2013, p. 43). Therefore, an 
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imposed arms embargo will increase the costs of continuing fighting. This will 
automatically lead to a decline in the military activities, decreasing conflict intensity 
(Hultman & Peksen, 2017). Portela (2010, p. 59) and Hultman and Peksen (2017) 
explain that arms embargoes are especially important in armed conflict situations. 
This is argued because this type of sanction directly targets the supply of weapons. 
Hereby they directly reduce the possibilities of battlefield violence and thus the 
intensity of the conflict (Hultman & Peksen, 2017; Portela, 2010, p. 59). Accordingly, 
out of all single-type EU sanctions, arms embargoes are expected to have the largest 
decreasing impacts on conflict intensity.  
 
Assets freeze 
An assets freeze is a financial restriction aimed to cause personal 
inconvenience and to hollow out the target’s capabilities and financial resources 
(Brzoska, 2003, p. 522). Moreover, an assets freeze reduces the availability of choices 
the target has and undermines the target’s activities (Eriksson, 2011, p. 28). For 
example, because of an assets freeze it might be difficult for the target to finance its 
battle forces (Eriksson & Wallensteen, 2015 p. 1396), making the deployment of 
these forces an unavailable option. These four factors affect the decisions the target 
makes within the conflict (Cortright & Lopez, 2002, 93-114; Biersteker & Eckert, 
2007; Giumelli, 2013, p. 44). Subsequently, due to assets freeze, conflict intensity is 
expected to reduce. 
 
Commodity and service boycotts 
 Commodity boycotts restrict the trade in specific products (e.g. timber, 
diamonds). Service boycotts prohibit any assistance to capacity building beneficial to 
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the condemned political activities (Giumelli, 2013, p. 44). This type of sanction 
undermines the target’s capabilities and resources, causes personal inconvenience 
(Giumelli, 2013, p. 44) and reduces the target’s available options to implement the 
targeted policy (Brzoska, 2003, p. 522). In addition, these boycotts can alter the 
distribution of power within the target’s country (Giumelli, 2013, p.45). Their impact 
is therefore extensive (Giumelli, 2013, p. 44), especially in the situation of an armed 
conflict (Portela, 2010, p. 99).  Therefore, commodity and service boycotts are 
expected to decrease conflict intensity.  
 
Multi-type sanction regime 
On the basis of a research of African armed conflicts, Brzoska (2005) found 
that sanctions have the most notable effect whenever they were imposed as a 
combination of multiple types of sanctions (Portela, 2010, p. 59). When imposed as a 
combination, different type of sanctions can reinforce and strengthen each other. 
Multi-type sanction regimes are thus expected to decrease the intensity of the conflict 
more compared to sanction regimes where only one type of sanction is imposed. 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above discussion this thesis argues that all types of EU sanctions 
reduce conflict intensity. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated: H1: EU 
sanctions decrease conflict intensity. However, certain sanction-types affect conflict 
intensity seemingly more prominently. To research to which extend these theoretical 
expectations are correct, two additional hypotheses are created. According to the 
theory, arms embargoes are expected to have a larger negative effect on the intensity 
of a conflict compared to other single-type EU sanctions. Therefore, a second 
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hypothesis is created: H2: Out of all single-type EU sanctions, arms embargoes have 
the largest decreasing impact on conflict intensity. In addition, sanction regimes 
consisting of multiple types of sanctions appear to be most effective in decreasing the 
intensity of a conflict (Brzoska, 2005; Portela, 2010, p. 59). For this reason, a third 
hypothesis is formulated: H3: EU sanctions decrease conflict intensity more when 
they consist of multiple sanction-types (vs. single-type sanctions).  
 
Research design 
 This thesis uses a mixed method design in order to strengthen the belief that 
the outcomes are valid and the result is reliable (Bouchard, 1976, p. 286; Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007).  In this thesis, a mixed method design implies the 
inclusion of a quantitative and a qualitative phase in the overall study (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20).  The purpose of such a design is complementary; the 
latter qualitative part deepens the understanding of the former quantitative part 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 22). The quantitative part gives insight on the 
correlations between the dependent and independent variable(s) on the basis of a large 
database. This is relevant in order to explore how the different variables are correlated 
and to extend the external validity of the outcomes of this research. However, this part 
cannot make firm claims on the causational relationships and no certainty exists that 
the control variables taken into account are exhaustive. In order to deepen our 
understanding of how different types of EU sanctions affect the intensity of an armed 
conflict, a qualitative study focused on the causational relationships that takes into 
account all possible other relevant variables, is needed.  
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Quantitative section: 
 To test the theoretical claims above on a quantitative basis all intra-state armed 
conflicts and EU sanctions in the period 1992-2012 are identified. The starting point 
of this analysis is 1992, because after the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1991, the 
EU has applied sanctions much more frequently (Druláková, Rolenc, Trávníčková & 
Zemanová, 2010, p. 109). Moreover, since then the EU is considered to be a new 
relevant actor on the sanctions scene (De Vries & Hazelzet, 2005, p. 95). The latest 
year taken into account is 2012, because of availability of data.  
 
Conflict intensity (dependent variable):  
 This variable is measured on the basis of the number of fatalities caused by the 
conflict. It takes into account all fatalities caused by the conflict, i.e. no distinction is 
made between civilian and other fatalities. In order to account for all the variations in 
the conflict intensity, this thesis uses a numerous count of the total number of 
fatalities for each year.   Regarding this variable, this thesis builds upon the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset Version 17.1 (Croicu & Sundberg, 2017; Sundberg & 
Melander, 2013). Within this data, high over-dispersion is present since the values 
vary from 1 to 499547.  
 
EU sanctions (independent variable): 
 In this research, the independent variable is EU sanctions. The identification 
of this variable is based upon Giumelli’s database (Giumelli, 2013), SIPRI’s database 
(SIPRI, 2018) and the GIGA sanctions database (Portela & van Soest, 2012). Multiple 
databases are used in order to give the most complete view of EU sanctioning 
practice.  
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Six different ‘sanctions variables’ are created in order to research the effect of 
various EU sanction types, i.e., this thesis researches the effect of six different 
independent variables. Firstly, the variable ‘EU sanctions’ is created. This is a dummy 
variable, a score of 1 indicates that a EU sanction has been in place and a score of 0 
indicates it has not. No specific types of EU sanctions are taken into account in this 
variable. Furthermore, four sanction type-specific dummy variables are created (‘arms 
embargoes’, ‘travel bans’, ‘assets freeze’ and ‘commodity and service boycotts’). To 
test the effect of multi-type sanction regimes, a final ‘sanctions variable’ is created: 
‘multi-type sanction regimes’. All these variables are coded in the same way as the 
general ‘EU sanctions’ variable, i.e. a score of 1 indicates EU sanctions have been in 
place a score of 0 indicates they have not. 
Armed conflict:  
This thesis relies on the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed 
Conflict data set v. 17.2. in order to identify armed conflicts (Allansson, Melander & 
Themnér, 2017; Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand, 2002). In line 
with previous scholars focusing on sanctions (Escribá-Folch, 2010; Hultman & 
Peksen, 2017; Regan, 2002), this thesis only takes into account intra-state conflicts. 
To identify the intrastate-armed conflicts two of the four types of conflicts available 
in the dataset are included: internal armed conflicts and internationalized internal 
armed conflicts. In the period 1992-2012, 586 years of intrastate-armed conflicts have 
been identified.  
 
Control variables (alternative explanations): 
 Several control variables that might influence the effect of EU sanctions on the 
conflict intensity are included. Firstly, this thesis controls for democracy since civil 
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conflict in a democracy is less likely to escalate to a high-intensity conflict (Eck, 
2009; Hultman & Peksen, 2017; Lacina, 2006).  Additionally, the quantitative 
methodology expects the chance that the EU imposed sanctions is the same for every 
country. However, EU sanctions are less likely to be imposed against democracies 
(Cox & Drury, 2006; Drury, James & Peksen, 2014). It controls for democracy by 
including the Polity2 index from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). In 
this dataset each country’s regime scores ranges from -10 to 10. This data is recoded 
in order to run the analysis to a scale from 0 – 20. 0 represents the lowest level of 
democracy and 20 represents the highest level of democracy. Secondly, this paper 
controls for UN presence, categorized in UNSC sanctions and UN peacekeeping 
operations (UNPKO). UN presence is taken into account because it can affect the 
impact of EU sanctions and the conflict intensity in multiple ways (Eriksson, 2011, p. 
108; Hoeffler, 2014; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014). This variable is based 
upon Kathman’s dataset (2013), the GIGA sanctions database (Portela & van Soest, 
2012) and the website of the UN. Again, multiple databases are used in order to get 
the most complete view. Lastly, this thesis controls for population since the size of the 
country may influence the decision to impose sanctions or not. Moreover, the size of 
the country affects the intensity of the conflict (Hultman & Peksen, 2017, p. 1325).  
This variable is based upon yearly data from the Worldbank. A log count of this data 
is used in order to run the analysis. Although the control variables differ in form 
(binary and scale), they can all be taken into account in the analysis. 
Various variables such as presence of natural resources and GDP are not taken 
into account although they might affect the correlation between EU sanctions and 
conflict intensity due the scope of this thesis. One needs to take this into consideration 
when drawing a conclusion based on the outcome of the quantitative analysis.  
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Methodology: negative binomial regression     
 This thesis uses a negative binomial regression because the dependent variable 
is based upon count data with high over-dispersion. Considering that six different 
independent variables are taken into account (the different ‘sanction variables’), this 
thesis runs six separate analyses. The unit of analysis is conflict-year. These annual 
observations are used since the data on conflict intensity, EU sanctions and armed 
conflicts are annually. Despite hindering the visibility of short-term effects (Hultman 
& Peksen, 2017), this approach clearly demonstrates the long-term trends of the 
effects of EU sanctions. Furthermore, a time-lag is not necessary within this conflict-
year analysis because governments are expected to respond to sanctions within 
months after imposition (Hultman & Peksen, 2017, p. 1323). Any effect is thus 
captured within the current unit of analysis. 
Qualitative Section:          
 The qualitative section of this thesis builds upon the same definitions of the 
concepts Conflict intensity, EU sanctions and Armed conflicts as the former part. The 
control variables are taken into account as alternative explanations. In addition, the 
same timeframe (1992-2012) is used on the basis of already mentioned motivations. 
 
Data: 
  The data used in this qualitative analysis are multiple primary and secondary 
sources of information. As such, official documents of the EU and other international 
actors are examined. In addition, reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other NGOs are considered. Furthermore, 
secondary sources as scientific articles are used as sources.  
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Methodology: process tracing      
 While the quantitative section focuses on the correlation between EU 
sanctions and conflict intensity, the qualitative part is devoted to research the causal 
mechanisms that account for this correlation. To this end, it uses the method of 
process tracing within a single case study. Process tracing is an especially useful 
additive to the quantitative part of this research since it is able to research the causal 
relationships (Bennett, 2004, p. 36).   
Case selection 
 The case is chosen on the basis of a ‘most likely case’ design (Bennett, 2004, 
p. 36). In the case under examination EU sanctions are thus expected to decrease 
conflict intensity, but the underlying causal relationships remain unclear. The case is 
identified upon the outcomes of the quantitative section. This section indicates that in 
order for an EU sanction to decrease conflict intensity, it must be imposed in the form 
of a multi-type sanction regime, including a travel ban. Consequently, these are the 
criteria for the case selection. On the basis of these criteria, the EU sanction regime on 
Ivory Coast following the post-election crisis in 2010/2011 is selected to be the case 
under examination.  
 
Empirical analysis 
What do the statistics say? 
This quantitative section begins with the evaluation of H1 and the possible 
effect EU sanctions have on conflict intensity, taking into account all sanctions-types. 
According to the results of Model 1 (Table 1), the general EU sanction variable is 
positively associated with conflict intensity in a statistically significant matter. This 
leads to the outcome that for every increase of imposed EU sanctions, there is a 
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predictable increase of the total number of fatalities. This finding leads to the rejection 
of H1: EU sanctions decrease conflict intensity. Although this finding is relevant, it 
does not specify possible answers of this thesis’ main question since it does not 
consider the variation between different types of EU sanctions. 
 In the subsequent models these different types are taken into account. 
According to H2, arms embargoes have a larger negative effect on conflict intensity 
compared to other single-type EU sanctions. Models II, III, IV, and V (Table 1) 
display the findings of each of these types. Model II indicates that arms embargoes 
are (just like the ‘general EU sanctions’) positively associated with conflict intensity 
in a statistically significant matter. In other words, for every increase of imposed arms 
embargoes, the total number of fatalities is predicted to increase. The predictable 
effect of travel bans is displayed in Model III. According to this outcome, travel bans 
are negatively associated with conflict intensity in a statistically significant manner. 
This means that for every increase in travel bans, there is a predictable decrease of the 
intensity of the conflict. In this regard it is important to point out that, as already 
indicated, travel bans are rarely imposed solely. In the database used in this thesis, the 
EU imposed a travel ban in 35 years of armed conflict. In 34 of these instances, the 
imposed travel ban is part of a multi-type sanction regime. The travel ban on 
Macedonia in 2001 is the only example of a single imposed travel ban by the EU  
(Giumelli, 2013, Appendix III). The implications of this finding are discussed in the 
concluding section of this quantitative analysis.
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Table 1. Imposed EU sanctions and conflict intensity  
	 Model I  Model I I  Model I I I  Model IV Model V Model VI   
EU sanctions 0.332(0.157)* - - - - - 
EU arms embargoes - 0.436(0.162)** - - - - 
EU Travel bans - - -0.721(0.261)** - - - 
EU Assets freeze - - - 0.601(0.886) - - 
EU Commodity / 
Service boycotts 
- - - - 1.786(9.571) - 
EU multi-type 
sanction regimes 
- - - - - -0.652(0.267)* 
Democracy -0.032(0.015)* -0.029(0,015) -0.101(0.020)*** -0.121(0.016)*** -0.030(0.012)* -0.100(0.020)*** 
UN sanctions (UN 
presence) 
2.114(0.252)*** 2.113(0.252)*** 7.129(7.044) 6.082(2.712)* 2.530(0.232)*** 7.152(7.093) 
UNPKOs (UN 
presence) 
0.253(0.160) 0.268(0.161) 1.623(0.303)*** 1.174(0.221)*** 0.103(0.126) 1.627(0.302)*** 
Population size (log) 0.078(0.054) 0.071(0.054) -0.239(0.077)** 0.007(0.058) 0.163(0.012)*** -0.242(0.077)** 
 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. UN PKO: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 
P < 0.05*, P<0.01**, p<0,001*** 
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Based on models IV and V, assets freeze and commodity and service boycotts are 
positively associated with conflict intensity. These associations are however 
statistically non-significant. Following this discussion, H2: Out of all single-type EU 
sanctions, arms embargoes have the largest decreasing impact on conflict intensity is 
rejected. In addition, it leads to the finding that in contrast to other single- types, a 
travel ban is negatively associated with the number of battle related deaths in a 
statistically significant manner.   
In Model VI (Table 1), a final sanction type is taken into account: multi-type 
EU sanction regimes. In the period under examination (1992-2012), the EU imposed 
multi-type sanction regimes during 34 years of armed conflict. Important to note it 
that every multi-type sanction regime included a travel ban. During this same period, 
the EU imposed single-type sanctions regimes during 70 years of armed conflict, 
often consisting of only an arms embargo. The outcome of model VI indicates that for 
every one unit increase of multi-type sanction regime, there is a predictable decrease 
of -0.652 log counts units on conflict intensity. Essentially, this indicates a predictable 
decrease in the total number of battle-related deaths for every multiple-type sanctions 
regime implemented. This finding is statistically significant. On the basis of this 
finding, H3: EU sanctions decrease conflict intensity more when they consist of 
multiple sanction-types (vs. single-type sanctions), is accepted. 
Multiple conclusions can be derived from these statistical findings regarding 
the relationship between the dependent and the various independent variables. Firstly, 
different types of EU sanctions cause different effects on conflict intensity. It is 
therefore crucial to examine these types of EU sanctions separately in order to see the 
true effects of various EU sanctioning practices. An examination of general  ‘EU 
sanctions’ gives a very distinctive image compared to an examination in which 
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different types are taken into account. Too much generalization, as present in H1, can 
be misleading (Giumelli, 2013, p. 58). Moreover, EU sanctions that have a decreasing 
effect on conflict intensity are only present in Model III and Model VI. This indicates 
that travel bans or multi-type sanction regimes should be imposed in order to decrease 
the intensity of the conflict and that travel bans have the most favourable effect on the 
decrease of human suffering.  
However, in the used dataset travel bans are almost always implemented as 
part of a multi-type sanction regime, i.e. independently imposed travel bans are not 
examined (one exemption present in which a travel ban was solely imposed). Because 
of this, no claims can be made on the separate effect of a travel ban. However, it is 
clear that when a travel ban is imposed as part of a multi-type sanction regime, it is 
expected to decrease the intensity of the conflict. The same reasoning can be applied 
to the multi-type sanction regime. Every multi-type sanction regime in this dataset 
includes a travel ban. Because of this, no claims can be made on the effect of a multi-
type sanction regime excluding a travel ban.  However, it is clear that when a multi-
type sanction regime including a travel ban is imposed, conflict intensity tends to 
decrease. Accordingly, on the basis of these statistical findings, this thesis cannot 
indicate which of the two types (or their combination) of an EU sanction is 
responsible for the decrease in conflict intensity. At this stage, it can only conclude 
that in order for an EU sanction regime to decrease the intensity of a conflict, it must 
be imposed in the form of a multi-type sanction regime, including a travel ban. 
 In addition to various EU sanctions variables, the control variables also appear 
to be relevant. As expected, democracy is negatively associated with the intensity of 
the conflict in all models. Moreover, in all models with the exception of Model II, this 
finding is significant. In essence this indicates that if a country scores higher on the 
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‘democracy’ variable, conflict intensity tends to be lower.  This research also controls 
for UN presence. The outcomes in Table 1 show that UN sanctions are positively 
correlated with conflict intensity in all models. In Model I, II, IV and V this finding is 
statistically significant. In addition UNPKOs are positively correlated with the 
intensity of a conflict in all models. In Model III, IV and VI this finding is statistically 
significant. The statistically significant outcomes indicate that for every increase in 
UN presence, conflict intensity rises. Seemingly, this effect is larger regarding UN 
sanctions, compared to an UNPKOs. Important to note is that the UN sanctions 
variable does not take into account the various UN sanctions types. Therefore, it is 
possible that the findings on this variable suffer from the same problem of over-
generalization, as also observed in the EU sanctions variable in Model 1. Accordingly, 
this thesis argues that it is premature to make statements on the effect of UN sanctions 
on conflict intensity. In order to make such statements, it is crucial to review different 
UN sanctions types individually. The same applies to UNPKOs. The last control 
variable, population size, also presents statistically significant findings. The 
correlation between this variable and conflict intensity differs substantially in the 
various models. As shown in Table 1, the population size is negatively associated with 
dependent variable in model III and VI. These findings are statistically significant. 
This indicates that with regards to these models, conflict intensity tends to decline 
whenever the population size is larger. In model V the findings show the reverse: the 
population size is positively associated with conflict intensity, again in a statistically 
significant matter. In Model I, II and IV the findings regarding the population size are 
statistically insignificant.  
The correlation between the dependent, the different independent and the 
control variable(s) is clear. However, these variables might influence each other in 
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multiple ways, and in multiple causal directions. Because of this, the previous analysis 
has so far only shed light on the predictable correlation between the variables. This 
raises the question: ‘What causes what?’ Moreover, regarding the findings in Model 
III and Model VI, the question ‘How do these types of EU sanctions decrease conflict 
intensity?’ also remains unanswered. In order to be able to answer these questions, it 
is crucial to acquire more in-depth knowledge on how multi-type sanction regimes 
(including a travel ban) reduce the number of human deaths in armed conflicts. This is 
the reason why, in this research, a qualitative analysis is needed. Therefore, this thesis 
now turns to the qualitative analysis on the basis of process tracing within a single 
case study. 
 
Looking beyond the numbers 
Since a multi-type sanction regime including a travel ban seems crucial in 
order for EU sanctions to decrease conflict intensity, this section explores an EU 
sanction regime where these criteria were present: the EU sanctions on Ivory Coast 
following the post-election crisis in 2010/2011.  
 
Context of the EU sanctions 
 The conflict in Ivory Coast began in 2002 when multiple attacks were 
launched on the countries major cities by rebel forces. This round of violence came to 
an end in 2005, when the two most important actors, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane 
Ouattara agreed to hold elections. These elections were eventually held on 31 October 
2010 and were monitored by the EU’s Electoral Observation Mission (Thematic 
Evaluation, 2011, p. 79) and the United Nations Operation Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
that was already present in the country. A second, determining round between Gbagbo 
and Ouattara was held on 28 November in the same year. On 2 December, the 
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independent Electoral Commisison (IEC) announced the results: candidate Ouattara 
had received 54% of the total votes and the incumbent President Gbagbo had received 
45% of the total votes (Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 498). The international community 
immediately endorsed this result (Cook, 2011, p. 1; Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 498). 
However, Gbagbo refused to step down, claiming the electoral victory himself 
(Ramsbotham, 2011, p. 500).  These developments led to a steep rise in the total 
number of battle-related deaths at the end of 2010 and in 2011 (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Overview of conflict intensity in Ivory Coast 2009-2015 based on the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset Version 17.1 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Conflict intensity  1 23 467 5 2 0 0 
 
 
The EU responds 
Gbagbo’s refusal to adhere to the results of the election “paved the way for the 
EU’s full commitment to solve the crisis, and restrictive measures played a vital role 
in this reaction” (Giumelli, 2013, p. 46). On 17 December 2010, the EU made its 
commitment clear in its Conclusions of the European Council of 16 and 17 December 
(European Council, 2010a). In these conclusions the EU “called on all Ivorian leaders, 
both civilian and military, who have not yet done so to place themselves under the 
authority of the democratically elected President, Mr. Alassane Ouattara” (European 
Council, 2010a, p.3). Moreover, the EU “confirmed the determination of the EU to 
take targeted restrictive measures against those who would continue to obstruct the 
respect of the sovereign will expressed by the Ivorian people” (European Council, 
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2010a, p.3).  Since this call did not change anything, the EU imposed various 
autonomous restrictive measures. In Table 3, all these sanctions are listed. The 
measures imposed by the EU were motivated by a constraining logic (Giumelli, 2013, 
p. 47). Accordingly, the goal of this design was to undermine and limit the capacity of 
Gbagbo and his supporters to challenge Ouattara ’s leadership and to trouble the 
democratic process (Giumelli, 2013, p. 47).  
In response to the Ivory Coast crisis, the UNSC also imposed various 
sanctions. However, the EU sanction regime differentiated from these sanctions since 
the measures imposed on 29 October 2010 (Giumelli, 2013, p. 46). The autonomous 
sanctions of the EU can thus best be understood as ‘supplementary measures’ that go 
beyond UNSC sanctions (Biersteker & Portela, 2015, p. 1: Council of the EU, 2012, 
p. 53). This is shown by the fact that during the most crucial period in the post-
election crisis, the EU imposed stricter and more extensive sanctions, making it a 
unilateral sanction regime on top of the UNSC measures. After the extreme violence 
ceased in the end of 2011, the EU sanction regime felt back in line with the UNSC 
sanctions (Giumelli, 2013, p. 47). The main goal of its actions then was to support to 
post-crisis stabilisation (Council of EU, 2011, p.2; Council of the EU, 2012, p. 53). 
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Table 3. Overview of relevant EU Council Decisions regarding Ivory Coast 
Date Council Decision Measure 
29 October 2010 
 
Council Decision 
2010/656/CFSP 
Adoption of UNSCR 1946 and the imposition of: 
· Arms embargo; 
· Asset freezes; 
· Travel bans; 
· Commodity (diamond) boycott 
(European Council, 2010b) 
22 December 2010 Council Decision 
2010/801/CFSP  
Imposition of travel ban on 19 individuals (including 
Gbagbo and his wife) 
(European Council, 2010c) 
11 January 2011 Council Decision 
2011/17/CFSP  
Addition of 59 persons to imposed travel ban list 
(European Council, 2011a) 
14 January 2011 Council Decision 
2011/18/CFSP  
Imposition of assets freeze on 85 persons and 11 entities 
(including the ports of Abidjan and San Pedro) 
(European Council, 2011b) 
31 January 2011 Council Decision 
2011/71/CFSP  
Addition of 6 persons and 2 entities to imposed assets 
freeze list 
(European Council, 2011c) 
6 April 2011 Council Decision 
2011/221/CFSP (in 
accordance with UNSCR 
1975)  
Addition of 27 individuals to imposed assets freeze list 
(European Council, 2011d) 
8 April 2011 Council Implementing 
Decision 2011/230/CFSP 
Withdrawal of assets freeze on 4 entities (including the 
ports of Abidjan and San Pedro)  
(European Council, 2011e) 
12 July 2011 Council Decision 
2011/412/CFSP 
Provide derogations on arms embargo 
(European Council, 2011f) 
8 March 2012 
 
Council Implementing 
Decision 2012/144/CFSP 
Withdrawal of travel bans and assets freezes 
(European Council, 2012) 
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Implementation 
In contrast to other instances of EU sanctions, each of the restrictive measures 
imposed during the course of the Ivory Coast crisis were announced with immediate 
implementation (see all Council Decisions). Such rapid implementation of targeted 
measures is considered important for achieving their maximum impact (Brzoska, 
2005; Eriksson, 2011, p. 29). Regarding the assets freeze and travel ban, it gave the 
subjects no opportunity to hide ownership of their assets in the EU or to transfer their 
assets out of the EU (Eriksson, 2011, p. 29; Giumelli, 2013, p. 113).  
In addition to the pace at which sanctions are implemented, the understanding 
of the broader strategic context of implementation is crucial to assess the sanction 
regime itself (Eriksson, 2011, p. 237). In this case, the regime was implemented as 
part of a wider package of EU actions regarding Ivory Coast (Thematic Evaluation, 
2011, p. 78). For example, the European Commission (EC) was one of the largest 
donors of the election process (Thematic Evaluation, 2011, p. 32). This support was a 
key contribution in making the elections to be considered transparent by the 
international community (Thematic Evaluation, 2011, p. 32). This in turn allowed the 
international community to have a firm common position in the context of this crisis 
(Thematic Evaluation, 2011, p. 58). Having said this, the EU sanctions were also part 
of a coordinated approach with other important international actors. The role of these 
actors is examined at a later stage of this section. 
 
Assessing the impact of the EU sanctions 
In the beginning of 2011, the EU sanctions began to have effect (IGC, 2011, p. 
20). Especially the economic sanctions of the EU (assets freeze, commodity and 
service ban) and the travel ban had a considerable impact on Gbagbo (Gilpin, 2011; 
IGC, 2011, p. 20). This impact was noticeable primarily in two different ways. Firstly, 
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the sanctions (especially the travel ban) isolated Gbagbo (Basset & Straus, 2011, p. 
138; ICG, 2011, p. 20). His isolation made Gbagbo even more dependent upon the 
two pillars of his regime: the civil service and the military. Maintaining these two 
pillars was crucial for his survival (ICG, 2011, p. 11). Secondly, the mix of EU’s 
economic sanctions decreased Gbagbo’s financial options severely (Gilpin, 2011; 
IGC, 2011, p. 20). In this regard, it is important to highlight that Ivory Coast is the 
world’s largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans (Gilpin, 2011). This industry 
was the main source of revenue for the Gbagbo regime (Cook, 2011, p.46; ICG, 2011, 
p. 17). Once a regime is very reliant on one commodity for its income, as in this case, 
sanctions are able to become very influential when they target this exact industry  
(Portela, 2010, p. 59). As a result of the EU ban on the three main cacao exporters, 
Gbagbo’s income was reduced significantly (Gilpin, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, the EU 
sanctions on the major ports of Abidjan and San Pedro had a large effect on all 
economic sectors depending on foreign trade (ICG, 2011, p. 17).  
Due to these severe financial consequences and his isolation, Gbagbo could 
not collect the money needed in order to pay the civil service’s and military’s salaries 
to keep them loyal to him (Cook, 2011, p. 48; Gilpin, 2011, p. 3; ICG, 2011, p. 11, 
20). As a result, the soldiers became reluctant to fight for him (Bassett & Straus, 2011, 
p. 138). These factors crumbled the foundation of Gbagbo’s regime and weakened his 
power and ability to challenge Ouattara‘s authority (Giumelli, 2017, p. 47). Taken 
into account this thesis’ focus on conflict intensity, it is important to note that the 
various economic sanctions and the travel ban reduced Gbagbo’s options to continue 
his efforts to end the conflict via the military path (Cook, 2011, p. 48; EU, 2013, p.45; 
Gilpin, 2011), leading to a decrease in conflict intensity.  
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Examining the impact of other factors 
 As already indicated, the EU was not the only international actor involved. 
Although various NGOs concerned with the situation highlighted the role of EU 
sanctions in the crisis (ICG, 2011; HRW, 2011), the EU itself accentuated the 
importance of the united stance of the international community (Council of the EU, 
2011). Key partners in this crisis were Economic Community of West African States  
(ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the French, and the UN (Council of the EU, 
2011; HRW, 2011). 
Both ECOWAS and the AU took a very strong and consistent position that 
Ouattara was the country’s legitimate President and Gbagbo had to step down (Basset 
& Straus, 2011, p. 131).  On the basis of this African consensus, it was easier for the 
international community to intervene with tough measures in the conflict (Basset & 
Straus, p. 138). Moreover, the African consensus limited Gbagbo’s room for 
diplomatic manoeuvre (Basset & Straus, 2011, p. 131).  In addition to this African 
consensus, the AU initiated multiple mediation attempts between Ouattara and 
Gbagbo, however unsuccessful (Apuuli, 2012, p.138). ECOWAS went a step further 
and threatened with military intervention upon Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power to 
Ouattara (Apuuli, 2012, p. 137; Basset & Straus, 2011, p. 131). Due to several factors, 
this threat was however unconvincing (Apuuli, 2012, p. 137; Cook, 2011, p. 44).  As a 
result, the most important impact of these two regional actors was that their consensus 
paved the way for other international actors to act as they did (Basset & Straus, 2011, 
p. 139). 
The French and the UN were already present in the country since 2004 by 
means of the French operation Licorne and the UN mission UNOCI (HRW, 2012). 
When assessing the impact of these operations, the adoption of UNSC 1975 on 30 
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March 2011, is important to take into account. Previous adopted UNSC resolutions 
firmly condemned Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power but the imposed sanctions had less 
tooth compared to the EU sanctions (Giumelli, 2013, p. 47). However, resolution 
1975 the UN authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to achieve its mission 
(UNSC, 2011). UNOCI and Licorne used this broadened mandate on 4 April when 
their helicopters destroyed Gbagbo’s heavy weapons and launched attacks on several 
of his military camps (Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p. 263). This intervention was 
decisive for Ouattara’s military win (Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p. 263).  Moreover, 
due to these actions pro- Ouattara forces were able to arrest Gbagbo at his residence at 
11 April 2011 (Apuuli, 2012, HRW, 2012; Past, 2012). His arrest marked the end of 
the conflict, and the high conflict intensity accompanying it (Apuuli, 2012; Bellamy 
& Williams, 2012, p. 265; Cook, 2011, p.1). In conclusion, both UNOCI and Licorne 
played a vital role in ending the conflict (Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p.265; HRW, 
2012; Past, 2012, p.1).   
This examination indicates that the intensity of the conflict not only declined 
because of EU’s efforts. In the context of this crisis, the united regional stance was 
important and the UN and the French played a decisive role in decreasing the conflict 
intensity. Especially the adoption of UNSC 1975 and the military intervention of 
UNOCI and Licorne are critical in this sense. However, as other scholars have already 
noticed, it was possible to arrest Gbagbo so quickly because his regime, his economic 
powers and his overall position were weakened severely as a consequence of EU 
sanctions (Guimelli, 2013, p. 58). 
Multiple lessons can be learned from this qualitative case study. Firstly, within 
this multi-type sanction regime, the damage to the target(s) was caused by mix of 
different types of EU economic sanctions and the travel ban. These measures 
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constrained the target from continuing his military efforts. The arms embargoes did 
not seem to hurt Gbagbo significantly. Secondly, in addition to the EU measures, the 
actions of multiple international actors were relevant to end the conflict and to 
decrease conflict intensity. Based on the qualitative analysis it is thus expected that 
EU sanctions are more effective in decreasing the human suffering if they are well 
aligned with the actions of other international actors. These are deeper insights on the 
causal relationships at play that the quantitative study cannot provide. Although based 
on a single case study, the lessons learned from this specific crisis have a broad 
relevance for future armed conflicts (Past, 2012, p. 1). Moreover, the findings are also 
relevant to the other instances were the EU imposed a multi-type sanction regime 
including a travel ban.  
 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this thesis is to answer the question: How do different types of EU 
sanctions affect conflict intensity? It focuses solely on the sanctions imposed by the 
EU because the EU is becoming an increasing important and active actor on the 
sanctions scene. Special attention is paid to the effects of these measures on conflict 
intensity, since this is a focus that is currently overlooked in much of the current 
literature. In addition, special attention is paid to the different effects various types of 
EU sanctions cause. A quantitative analysis is conducted to give insights in the 
statistical correlations between the various variables. This analysis is supplemented 
with a qualitative single-case to deepen the understanding of the causal relationships 
underpinning these correlations.  
 By means of a negative binominal regression, the quantitative section indicates 
that the type of EU sanction imposed is crucial regarding its effect on conflict 
34  
intensity. If different types are not taken into account, EU sanctions are positively 
associated with conflict intensity; therefore, the first hypothesis is rejected. However, 
if various types are observed, the results are different. In contrast to arms embargoes, 
assets freeze and commodity/service boycotts, an increase in imposed travel bans is 
expected to account for a predictable reduction of conflict intensity. Because of this 
finding, the second hypothesis is also rejected. The last type included is a multi-type 
sanction regime. The outcomes indicate that whenever an EU sanction regime consists 
of various sanction-types, it is negatively associated with conflict intensity. This 
finding is statistically significant. To this end, the third hypothesis is accepted. Travel 
bans and multi-type sanction regimes are thus expected to decrease conflict intensity. 
However, on the basis of this research, no conclusions can be derived on their 
individual effects since in the used database they are not examined solely (one 
exception present). This is due to the fact that in all of the multi-type sanction regimes 
imposed during the period under observation, a travel ban is present. At the same 
time, travel bans are always imposed as part of a multi-type sanction regime (one 
exception present). On the basis of the quantitative analysis, it can be concluded that 
in order for an EU sanction regime to decrease conflict intensity, it must consist of a 
multi-type sanction regime including a travel ban. 
 The qualitative section provides deeper understanding of the working of EU 
sanctions by examining the EU sanction regime on Ivory Coast in response to the 
post-election crisis in 2010/2011. In this case, the EU imposed a multi-type sanction 
regime where a travel ban was also included. It was found that the combination of EU 
sanctions had two main consequences for Gbagbo: isolation and severe financial 
difficulties. This led to his inability to maintain the two pillars upon which his regime 
was build: the civil service and the military. As a consequence, Gbagbo was unable to 
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continue on the military path and conflict intensity dropped accordingly. In addition, 
the case study shows the importance of the other international actors involved in this 
conflict. Due to the combination of EU sanctions, the united stance of the African 
community, the (military) involvement of the French and the UN, the crisis was 
solved quite rapidly. Accordingly, conflict intensity decreased rapidly too.  
The empirical analysis agreed with the majority of the theoretical expectations 
on how EU sanctions affect the conflict intensity presented in this thesis. However, it 
also poses some difficulties for the theoretical arguments. The theory on the separate 
types of EU sanctions does not indicate the necessity of these measures being imposed 
in combination with each other and assumes that any type of sanction can reduce 
conflict intensity ‘on it’s own’. However, the research (both sections) of this thesis 
indicates that the condition of a multi-type sanction regime including a travel ban is 
crucial regarding the decrease of conflict intensity. The results also show that EU 
sanctions and their effects should always be assessed as part of a wider package of 
international action. These findings contribute particularly to the maturation of the 
third stream in the sanctions literature, focusing on the effects on conflict intensity.  
These findings have important implications for policy makers concerned with 
the imposition of EU sanctions. Firstly, they indicate that an EU sanctions regime 
should always consist of multiple type of sanctions including a travel ban. For 
example, only imposing an arms embargo appears not to be enough to alleviate the 
human suffering. Secondly, they show that it is crucial that EU sanctions are well 
aligned with the actions of other international actors. These insights can be applied to 
UN sanctions as well. 
Some additional notes ought to be made regarding the limitations and further 
implications of this thesis. Firstly, it only analyses the events that are present in the 
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armed conflict dataset. This might hinder the visibility of the effect of EU sanctions. 
To illustrate this, there are some instances of conflicts that are included in the armed 
conflict dataset and have a very high level of conflict intensity in the first year of the 
conflict (Libya 2011; Serbia 1999; Uzbekistan 2004). In these cases, the EU imposed 
sanctions. However, these conflicts are not present in the armed conflict database in 
the following years because the conflict intensity dropped so severely. Possibly, EU 
sanctions could have been a reason for this drop in the intensity of the conflict. 
However, because these conflicts are only present in the dataset in the years when 
conflict intensity was very high, this possible effect of EU sanctions is not measured. 
An interesting follow-up of this thesis would be to examine the effect of EU sanctions 
by taking into account the period after the conflict is present in the armed conflict 
database. This might develop our knowledge on the effect of EU sanctions on conflict 
intensity further.  
Secondly, this thesis does not distinguish between different targets. Therefore, 
it cannot make any claims whether it matters who the target is. For example, does it 
make a difference if a sanction is imposed against the leader of a rebel group or 
against a current president? Although this question has not been explored in the 
sanctions literature yet, it is a very interesting path to follow for further research on 
the effect of EU sanctions. In this research the combination of literature on sanctions 
and conflict intensity have led to new insights. This might as well be the case when, in 
future research, combining sanctions literature with literature that does differentiate 
between targets (e.g. mediation literature). 
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